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The Legal Framework for Rare Earth Protection in Algeria: A Comparative and Foundational Study

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Abstract

This study assesses how far the Algerian legislature, through a legislative path running from independence to Law No. 25-12 of 3 August 2025 on mining activities, has built an integrated and effective legal framework for the protection of rare earth elements, one able to meet the demands of the transition from the carbon economy to the electronic economy. It adopts a comparative analytical legal method. The provisions of Law No. 25-12 are read closely, the development of Algerian mining legislation is traced from the law of 1984, and the findings are set against the European (Regulation 2024/1252), American (Executive Order 13817), Chinese and Indonesian experiences. The concept of ‘legal disruption’ serves as the test criterion for the two research hypotheses.

The findings confirm both hypotheses. Algerian legislative development has been gradual and belated, governed by the logic of sovereignty over natural resources rather than by technological anticipation, since the law names neither rare earth elements nor critical minerals and defers the designation of regulated substances to a ministerial decision (Article 9). The law nonetheless marks a qualitative shift in its structure, notably through the real mining title, compulsory State participation of at least 20 per cent, a specialised mining police, transparency mechanisms and graduated penalties. Four implementation gaps persist, namely deferred classification, the absence of value chain traceability, the exclusion of processing industries from the scope of the law (Article 122 allows only an administrative ‘request’), and the omission of recycling. The study recommends issuing the ministerial decision with a published list of strategic substances headed by rare earth elements, making local processing a condition of the exploitation title, and completing the system with provisions on traceability and recycling.

Keywords: rare earth elements, legal protection, Mining Law No. 25-12, critical minerals, legal disruption, sovereignty over natural resources.

Introduction:

Strategic natural resources have long attracted legislative intervention of steadily increasing intensity, owing to the dual nature of their legal status. On the one hand, they constitute national wealth subject to the principle of permanent sovereignty of states over their natural resources, which is enshrined in public international law through resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (**Assembly, 1962**). On the other, they are the object of fierce international economic competition that calls for renewed preventive and regulatory legislation (**Nations, 1962**). Over the past two decades, ‘rare earth elements’ have emerged as one of the clearest expressions of this duality, being an indispensable input for the precision technologies on which the transition from the traditional ‘carbon economy’ to the digital ‘electronic economy’ rests (**AGENCY, 2024**). Comparative legal systems have accordingly been prompted to reconsider how this resource is classified and how its exploitation is controlled, so as to reconcile the need to attract foreign investment with the need to safeguard national sovereignty over strategic mineral wealth (**EUR-Lex, 2024**).

Algeria is among the states endowed with a considerable reserve of rare earth elements, particularly in the Hoggar and Tamanrasset regions (**Aissa, 2002**) (**Oxford, 2025**). This has confronted the Algerian legislature with a recurring regulatory task, namely to control the exploitation of this wealth and to protect it, one that stretches from the first mining

legislation after independence (**Loucif, 2026**) to the most recent legislative intervention, Law No. 25-12 of 3 August 2025 on mining activities (**Algeria, 2025**). The law uses neither the term 'rare earth elements' nor the term 'strategic resource' expressly. It leaves the designation of the substances subject to the mining regime to a later ministerial decision (Article 9), and it merely allows the National Agency for Mining Activities to request local processing (Article 122), without making this a direct obligation on the operator (**Spalding, 2025**). Such a development raises the question of how far it accords with the demands of the present period and how closely it keeps pace with comparative experience, above all that of China, the United States and the European Union (**Agency, 2026**) (**service, 2026**).

Against this background, the research problem may be stated as follows. To what extent has the Algerian legislature, through a legislative path extending from independence to the 2025 Mining Code, succeeded in building an integrated and effective legal framework for the protection of rare earth elements, one capable of meeting the demands of the transition from the carbon economy to the electronic economy when measured against leading comparative experience?

To answer the question posed by the research problem, the following hypotheses are advanced.

First hypothesis:

The development of Algerian legislation on the protection of rare earth elements has been gradual and belated in character. It has been tied chiefly to the logic of sovereignty over natural resources rather than to a proactive strategic vision of the requirements of the digital economy.

Second hypothesis:

The new Mining Code (2025) represents a regulatory step in restructuring mining activity. It nonetheless neither names rare earth elements nor expressly classifies them as a strategic resource, since it leaves the designation of the substances subject to the mining regime to a later ministerial decision. It also suffers from implementation gaps when set against the comparative models, particularly in respect of local processing, which remains a mere possibility that the regulator may request, and in respect of mechanisms of subsequent oversight.

On a different note, the question of the legal protection of rare earth elements in Algeria specifically has not received independent, specialised studies that address it directly. Even so, the comparative research field concerned with the legal framework governing rare earth elements and critical minerals has seen serious contributions from which methodological benefit can be drawn, the most prominent of which are the following.

1. A study by Alessandra Hool, Christoph Helbig and Gijsbert Wierink, entitled 'Challenges, opportunities of the European Critical Raw Materials Act'.

This study offers a legal analysis of the European Critical Raw Materials Act, the legal framework governing the protection and exploitation of strategic minerals, among them the rare earth elements used in permanent magnets, renewable energy and the defence industries. It examines the legal mechanisms adopted by the European Union. The most important of these are the designation of critical and strategic raw materials, the acceleration of permitting procedures, the creation of strategic projects, the development of extraction and processing within Europe, the encouragement of recycling and the diversification of import sources (**Wierink, 2023, p. 661**).

This study bears on the subject of the legal regime protecting rare earth elements in Algeria in several respects. It offers a modern legal model for regulating strategic mineral resources, and it shows how the protection of the resource may be combined with the security of supply, the encouragement of investment, environmental protection and the development of recycling. It also allows the European system to be compared with the Algerian one in terms of licensing procedures, the designation of strategic projects, oversight of exploitation, waste management, the development of processing industries and the reduction of external dependence.

The benefit to be drawn from this study lies in the possibility of adopting the European Critical Raw Materials Act as a model for comparison with Algerian legislation, above all by examining how far the Algerian Mining Code and the related environmental and investment rules are capable of achieving the same objectives. The study may also help in assessing whether the legal system contains specific mechanisms for the protection and rational exploitation of rare earth elements, or whether it merely applies the general rules on mining, the environment and investment.

That said, this study differs from the present one in that its subject is the legal policy of the European Union as a whole, whereas the proposed research concentrates on Algeria, with the possibility of comparing the Algerian experience with the European one. The European study also treats critical raw materials in their broad sense. The present research, by contrast, centres on rare earth elements as one of the most important components of strategic and critical raw materials.

2. A study by Godfrey Gandawa, entitled 'Critical Minerals, Green Industrialisation, and the Framework of the Global Energy Transition'.

The study set out to analyse the legal frameworks governing the extraction, trade and beneficiation of critical minerals, rare earth elements among them, on the African continent. Its sample consisted of African legislation, including that of the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its principal variables concerned the degree to which the environmental dimension had been integrated into mining legislation, and it relied on a comparative method of legislative content analysis. It concluded with an analysis of how the integration of environmental considerations into the mining legal frameworks of these two countries has developed, together with a proposal for a strategic legal architecture for Africa's role in the global energy transition (**Godfrey Gandawa, 2026, p. 2002**).

3. A study by Victor Crochet and Weihuan Zhou, entitled ‘Critical insecurities? The European Union’s strategy for a stable supply of minerals’.

The study set out to analyse the European Union’s legal strategy for securing the supply of critical minerals. Its sample consisted of European legislation, namely the Critical Raw Materials Act, and it is in some respects similar to the first study. Its principal variables were mandatory recycling requirements and state support, and it relied on a descriptive legal analysis. It concluded that the Critical Raw Materials Act requires European industries to meet an increasing minimum share of recycled content in critical minerals, rare earth elements used in permanent magnets among them, as part of a broader strategy to reduce reliance on external suppliers (Zhou, 2024, p. 147) .

4. A study by Seita Vesa, Kaisa Huhta and Niko Soininen, entitled ‘Critical raw materials and the law: confronting legal disruption in the transition to sustainability’.

Within this body of knowledge, the present study also intersects with contemporary international legal scholarship on the difficulty of regulating strategic mineral reserves. Vesa and others observe that the transition towards a low-carbon economy depends absolutely on rare and critical minerals. The study grounds the concept of ‘legal disruption’, showing that rapid technological and economic change exposes deep gaps in the authority, competence and capacity of traditional legislative systems, which are slow-moving and conservative by nature (Seita Vesa et al., 2025, p. 497).

From this comparative perspective, tracing the development of Algerian legislation up to Law No. 25-12 makes it possible to ask how far the national legislature has responded to these challenges. The question is whether successive mining and environmental statutes have managed to meet the problem of ‘legal disruption’ and to frame proactive rules that protect rare earth elements and safeguard the country’s digital and environmental security.

The four studies agree with the present one in their general objective, which is to assess the effectiveness of national and regional legal frameworks in protecting rare earth elements as a strategic resource, and in the method adopted, namely comparative legal analysis. They differ from it, however, as to sample. Those studies concern the United States and China, Central Africa and the European Union, whereas the present study concerns Algeria and compares it specifically with the European Union.

First: Theoretical framework of the study

1. Definition of rare earth elements:

According to the United States Geological Survey, rare earth elements are a group of 17 chemical elements comprising scandium, yttrium and the lanthanides. Their crustal abundance varies from cerium to thulium and lutetium (Center, 2025). The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) clarifies that this group comprises, specifically, the fifteen elements of the lanthanide family together with scandium and yttrium (Balaram, 2019, p. 1285). It is observed in the literature that the label ‘rare’ does not reflect their geological abundance. It reflects instead the difficulty of extracting them in concentrations that are economically viable.

Among the rare earth elements are those set out in the following table.

Table (01) sets out the group of 17 chemical elements that make up what are termed ‘rare earth elements’.

Element	Symbol
Scandium	Sc
Yttrium	Y
Lanthanum	La
Cerium	Ce
Praseodymium	Pr
Neodymium	Nd
Promethium	Pm
Samarium	Sm
Europium	Eu
Gadolinium	Gd
Terbium	Tb
Dysprosium	Dy
Holmium	Ho
Erbium	Er
Thulium	Tm
Ytterbium	Yb
Lutetium	Lu

Source: prepared by the researchers on the basis of (Center, 2025)

In terms of geological presence in Algeria, several specialised geological studies have shown that the post-Pan-African granites of central and western Hoggar host rare earth mineralisation systems. Considerable concentrations occur in the carbonatites of In Aghabir and Iharhaouene, within apatite and britholite minerals. (Aissa, 2002, pp. 01-02).

2. Definition of legal protection:

Legal protection is defined as the body of legislative, regulatory and judicial mechanisms, both preventive and punitive, that the legislature establishes in order to safeguard a particular right or interest against any unlawful attack or exploitation. The protection of strategic resources takes two inseparable dimensions. The first is preventive, consisting of classification and prior licensing, and the second is punitive, consisting of liability and sanctions.

3. Definition of Law No. 25-12 on mining activities:

This is the law issued on 3 August 2025 following approval by both parliamentary chambers, and published in issue No. 52 of the Official Gazette of the Algerian Republic. It comprises 217 articles divided into ten parts, and it aims to strengthen Algeria's economic sovereignty and to diversify national income away from hydrocarbons. The law contains no explicit reference to 'rare earth elements' or to 'strategic resources', since the classification of the substances subject to the mining regime is left to a subsequent ministerial decision under (Article 9) (Algeria, 2025, p. 04).

Second: Applied framework of the study: testing the hypotheses in the light of the provisions of Mining Law No. 25-12 and comparative experience

1. Testing the first hypothesis, the gradual and belated character of Algerian legislative development and the dominance of the logic of sovereignty over the logic of anticipation

1.1 A reading of the legislative structure of Law No. 25-12:

The first hypothesis rests on the proposition that Algerian legislative development in the field of protecting rare earth elements has been gradual and belated. It has been tied to the logic of permanent sovereignty over natural resources more closely than to a proactive strategic vision of the requirements of the digital economy. Testing this hypothesis calls for a return to the legislative text itself as the binding legal instrument, rather than to the political discourse that accompanies it.

1.1.1 On confirming the sovereign character of protection:

A survey of the provisions of Law No. 25-12 shows that the logic of sovereignty over natural resources is the founding logic of the entire statute, and not the logic of the digital economy or technological security. Article 3 provides that 'mineral and fossilised substances, whether discovered or undiscovered, located within the national land domain or within the maritime zones subject to the sovereignty or sovereign rights of the State, are public property belonging to the national community, which the State manages and develops from a sustainable development perspective'.

The legal analysis of this provision shows that the legislature reproduced the classical constitutional formula on sovereignty over resources (Article 20 of the 2020 constitutional amendment) without any qualitative adjustment to reflect the new strategic nature of certain minerals. The protection afforded here is the protection of ownership (*propriété publique*), and not a functional protection aimed at securing an industrial and technological value chain. This accords with recent Algerian scholarship, which holds that Law No. 25-12 marks a turning point in legislative reform towards a balance between the protection of national sovereignty and the attraction of foreign investment, even as its practical implementation remains contingent on stronger institutional oversight and transparent enforcement mechanisms (Arous, 2026, p. 386).

1.1.2 On the absence of an express designation of rare earth elements:

The most telling practical indication of the legislature's tardiness is that Law No. 25-12, although enacted in 2025, more than two decades after critical minerals rose on the international agenda, contains neither the term 'rare earth elements' nor the term 'critical minerals' (*minerais critiques*). Article 8 settles for a classical classification of mineral wealth (radioactive substances, solid fuel substances, metallic substances, precious metals, meteorites and non-metallic substances), while Article 9 leaves the list of substances subject to the mining regime to a decision of the minister responsible for mining. In technical legal terms, this means that the inclusion of rare earth elements within the mining regime is effected by a later regulatory act that can be amended or withdrawn, and not by a stable legislative provision enjoying a higher degree of immunity. This amounts to a structural weakness in the level of legal protection afforded to them when set against that found in the comparative systems.

1.1.3 on the historical progression:

The Algerian legislative path confirms the gradual and belated character of this development. It begins with the law of 1984 (84-06), which established State monopoly through the national enterprise (SONAREM). The law of 2001 (01-10) then opened exploration and exploitation to partnership through the national agency (ANGCM). The law of 2014 (14-05) abandoned the system of the mining title in favour of a licensing system, until Law No. 25-12 partially restored the logic of the mining title and of real rights (Article 53) (Arous, 2026, p. 385) (Belfadhel, 2020, p. 640). This trajectory shows that each legislative amendment came as a reaction to cyclical economic challenges, namely the opening to investment after the financial crisis and then the decline in foreign investment. None of them resulted from a forward-looking vision of the part played by minerals in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

1.2 Weighing the first hypothesis against comparative experience:

When the first hypothesis is set against comparative experience, the contrast between the Algerian approach and the leading approaches becomes stark.

1.2.1 The experience of the European Union:

The European Commission began issuing periodically updated lists of critical raw materials as early as 2011. This culminated in the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, known as the 'Critical Raw Materials Act' (CRM Act) (EUR-

Lex, 2024). It identified 34 critical raw materials and 17 strategic raw materials, among them the heavy and light rare earth elements. It also laid down quantified benchmarks for strategic planning, which are binding as planning indicators although not binding in penal terms. By 2030, the Union is to reach 10 per cent of annual consumption from domestic extraction, 40 per cent from domestic processing and 25 per cent from recycling, while no more than 65 per cent of its consumption of any strategic raw material is to depend on a single third country (**Breuvart et al., 2026**) (**European Court of Auditors, 2026**). The essential difference here is that the European legislature named the materials in the Regulation itself and set quantified time limits. The Algerian legislature, by contrast, referred the entire matter of designation to a ministerial decision that is undated and whose issue is not guaranteed.

1.2.2 China's experience (law as a strategic instrument):

For several years China has operated a composite system that combines extraction and production quotas with export controls under the Export Control Law (2020) (**Nonn, 2021, p. 81**). In 2025 it widened export licensing to cover seven rare earth elements and their magnets, an express legal use of mineral wealth as an instrument of geopolitical leverage. Whatever view is taken of this choice in political terms, it demonstrates that the legal protection of rare earth elements in the leading experiences is not a matter of real property. It is a system of prior intervention (*régulation proactive*) covering production, manufacturing and export together. Algerian law still falls short of such a system, since it merely provides that the National Agency for Mining Activities 'may' request local processing (Article 122), without making this a direct statutory obligation on the operator.

1.2.3 The concept of 'legal disruption' (as a test criterion):

The concept of legal disruption developed by (**Seita Vesa et al., 2025, p. 497**) serves as a precise analytical criterion for testing the hypothesis. A legislature confronted with a technological surge, such as the shift towards a low-carbon economy and the digital economy, inevitably faces a gap between the speed of technology and the slowness of the legal rule. Its success is measured by its capacity to build flexible and proactive frameworks that close that gap. Applied to the Algerian case, this criterion confirms the first hypothesis. Law No. 25-12 may have reformed the general framework for mining activities, but it treated rare earth elements with the same traditional legal instruments (public ownership, the mining title, mining police and the like), which were designed originally for the minerals of the classical industrial economy. It introduced no special regime for critical minerals built on declared classification, objectives of industrial self-sufficiency and controls over the value chain.

The first hypothesis is therefore supported by the text. An analytical reading of Articles 3, 8 and 9 of Law No. 25-12, set against European Regulation 2024/1252 and the Chinese export control system, supports the view that the Algerian legislature has remained within the classical logic of sovereignty, namely public ownership and licensing, with the residue of State monopoly visible in the historical course of the 1984 law. It has not yet risen to the logic of mineral security that underpins the leading legislative models. The gradual and belated character of Algerian legislative development is accordingly a finding borne out by the textual reading and not a mere impression. That conclusion remains subject to confirming that the ministerial decision referred to in Article 9 has not been issued.

2. Testing the second hypothesis: the qualitative shift and the implementation gaps in Law No. 25-12 when set against the leading models

2.1 Manifestations of the qualitative shift in the strategic resources protection:

The analysis does not deny that Law No. 25-12 brought about a genuine qualitative shift in several respects, which supports the first part of the second hypothesis.

2.1.1 Restoration of the mining title and the real right:

Article 53 provides that exploitation titles confer on their holder 'a real right of limited duration, separate from ownership of the land', and Article 59 confirms that these titles confer no ownership of the land or its subsoil. This arrangement gives national and foreign investors a higher level of legal security than existed under the purely licensing system of Law No. 14-05. It thereby increases the attractiveness of exploiting strategic resources, while original ownership remains vested in the national community (**Safa, 2025, p. 262**).

2.1.2 Compulsory State participation as a sovereign mechanism:

Article 101 provides that, where exploitation licences are granted to entities wholly or partly foreign-owned, the national enterprise is to hold a share of not less than 20 per cent of the capital. This share may be raised without any ceiling in sites awarded through competition. The State also enjoys a right of pre-emption when shares are assigned. In comparative terms, this mechanism comes close to the model of 'sovereign participation' adopted in Chile (for lithium) and in Namibia and Botswana (for diamonds). It also goes further than the European model, which has no comparable compulsory participation mechanism.

2.1.3 The specialised oversight system (the mining police):

Article 146 created a mining police body composed of sworn engineers attached to the National Agency for Mining Activities (ANAM). They hold powers of continuous inspection, of requesting samples and documents, and of issuing binding orders in situations of danger (Article 149). The law also established transparency through a public mining register, in paper and digital form (Articles 5 and 58), and through the award of mineral sites by competitive notice (Article 96). It further created the National Bank of Geological Data, together with a mandatory legal deposit of geological information (Articles 5, 94 and 143).

2.1.4 Graduated criminal protection:

The law enacted a comprehensive penal system that escalates by degrees. Exploitation without a title is punishable by imprisonment of two months to two years and a fine of up to two million dinars (Article 191). Exploitation in protected sites carries imprisonment of two to four years (Article 196). At the top of the scale, marine pollution caused by mining is punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of five million dinars (Article 202). Confiscation remains possible, as does the liability of legal persons (Articles 208 and 209).

2.1.5 Special protection for unique rare materials:

For the first time, the law regulated the collection of meteorites (Articles 19, 50 and 110 to 112), treating them as public property of the State. It confined collection licences to Algerian nationals and prohibited the export of samples without authorisation. This is a legislative precedent that reveals the legislature's awareness of 'rarity' as a constituent element of protection, although it was confined to meteorites and did not extend conceptually to rare earth elements.

2.2 Implementation gaps in the light of comparative experience:

The second part of the second hypothesis, namely the existence of implementation gaps, finds its legal basis in four structural shortcomings.

2.2.1 The classification gap:

The failure to name rare earth elements in the legislation, and their referral to a ministerial decision (Article 9), empties the protection of its strategic content. The legal protection of a mineral begins only from the moment its strategic status is declared in a stable text. This is what European Regulation 2024/1252 did by annexing the list of the 34 materials to the body of the Regulation itself (**EUR-Lex, 2024**). The same is true of what the United States did through the list of critical minerals issued by the Department of the Interior under Executive Order 13817 and updated periodically (**Donald J. Trump, 2017**). The Algerian ministerial decision, moreover, had not yet been issued at the time this study was prepared. Rare earth elements therefore remain in a position of being 'not legally classified', despite their geological presence in Hoggar and Tamanrasset being established.

2.2.2 The gap in subsequent oversight and traceability:

The Algerian system lacks any scheme for the traceability of the value chain or for issuing certificates of origin for extracted materials. The European Union Regulation, by contrast, obliged economic operators to exercise due diligence along the length of the chain, and the Chinese model subjects every export shipment to prior licensing. Algerian law has settled for on-site oversight (the mining police within the site), without any sequential oversight of the material from the subsoil to the market.

2.2.3 The gap in the accompanying processing industry:

This is the most serious gap in light of the subject of the study. Article 122 merely empowers the Agency to 'request' the treatment, refining or conversion of all or part of production in units located in Algeria, while Article 14 confines 'valorisation' to first-stage processing and does not treat anything beyond it as a mining activity. In legal terms, deep industrial processing of rare earth elements (separation, purification and the manufacture of magnets) therefore falls outside the Mining Law altogether. It is subject to no mandatory obligation, only to an administrative 'request'. By comparison, Indonesia has banned the export of raw nickel since 2014 in order to compel investors to build processing plants domestically, and the European CRM Act sets a target of 40 per cent for domestic processing. The Algerian choice has remained one of administrative incentive and not of legislative obligation. Articles 121 and 123 do give priority to the national market and to Algerian companies and labour. These are positive provisions, yet they do not address the core problem of added value in critical minerals.

2.2.4 The recycling and circular economy gap:

Law No. 25-12 makes no mention of the recycling of spent minerals (*urban mining*) or of the recovery of rare earth elements from electronic waste. Yet this route has become an independent legal pillar in the European CRM Act, with its 25 per cent recycling target, and in Japanese legislation as well. The Algerian system still regards the mineral as a subterranean wealth to be extracted once, and not as an urban stock capable of being recycled and requiring independent legal protection (**Mohamed, 2023, p. 723**). Algerian environmental administrative policing remains preventive and exercised in advance, and does not extend beyond the life cycle of the product.

The second hypothesis is therefore supported by the text in both of its parts. Law No. 25-12 achieved a qualitative shift that cannot be denied (the real mining title, the 20 per cent sovereign participation, the mining police, transparency and the penalties, among other features). Yet it continues to suffer from genuine implementation gaps in four respects, namely deferred classification, the absence of sequential oversight, the exclusion of processing industry from the scope of the law, and the neglect of the circular economy. These are the very gaps that the European, Chinese and Indonesian experiences addressed through direct legislative provisions.

Conclusion of the study:

The testing of both hypotheses against the text of Law No. 25-12 yielded the following findings.

First: The first hypothesis was confirmed. Algerian legislative development in the protection of rare earth elements has been gradual and belated. It has been governed by the logic of sovereignty over natural resources (Article 3 on public ownership and Article 101 on sovereign participation) and not by the logic of technological anticipation. This is shown by the absence of any express naming of rare earth elements and critical minerals in the body of the legislation, and by the referral of their classification to later regulation (Article 9), at a time when comparative experience has legislated closed lists and binding quantified indicators.

Second: The second hypothesis was confirmed in both its parts. The qualitative shift is present in the structure of the law (the real right, specialised oversight, transparency and penalties, among other features). The implementation gaps are equally present in its function (suspended classification, absent traceability, optional processing and neglected recycling). **Third:** In the light of the concept of legal disruption (Vesa et al., 2025), it may be said that the Algerian legislature has succeeded in restoring the classical mining legal framework but has not yet succeeded in moving beyond it towards a distinct legal regime for critical minerals. The first practical recommendation is to hasten the issue of the ministerial decision implementing Article 9, containing a published list of strategic substances headed by rare earth elements. The second is to convert the 'request' for local processing in Article 122 into an obligation attached to the grant of the exploitation title. The third is to complete the system with provisions on value chain traceability and recycling. Such measures would make Algeria a partner in the global electronic economy and not merely a supplier of raw materials.

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