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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE, PRIVACY, AND HUMAN DIGNITY UNDER THE GDPR AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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ABSTRACT

The rapid acceleration of algorithmic decision-making, predictive processing, and automated profiling within public administration and private commerce presents a profound structural challenge to the traditional European constitutional framework. This paper critically examines the intersection of algorithmic governance, data privacy, and fundamental human rights within the legal architecture of the European Union. Focusing on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 1 and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), this study investigates whether existing normative instruments provide adequate safeguards against the erosion of individual autonomy, procedural fairness, and human dignity. Through a rigorous doctrinal analysis and socio-legal synthesis, the paper dissects the statutory ambiguities surrounding Article 22 of the GDPR, the legal limits of automated profiling, and the constitutional limits of data-driven surveillance. The analysis reveals systemic gaps between technological deployment and judicial enforcement, particularly regarding the opacity of deep-learning algorithms and the doctrine of meaningful human intervention. The study proposes a comprehensive normative model termed Dignity-Centred Algorithmic Accountability, aimed at bridging the gap between technological innovation and constitutional protection.

Keywords: Digital Rights, Human Dignity, Algorithmic Governance, GDPR, Charter of Fundamental Rights, European Constitutional Law.

1. INTRODUCTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

1.1 The Digital Imperative and the Constitutional Crisis

The integration of advanced automated systems, predictive algorithms, and machine learning models into the socio-political fabric of contemporary society represents a fundamental transformation in governance. Decisions that were historically rendered by human administrators, judicial officers, and corporate agents—ranging from welfare distribution, credit scoring, and predictive policing to recruitment and migration control—are increasingly delegated to automated decision-making systems. While these technological developments promise unprecedented administrative efficiency, scale, and statistical precision, they simultaneously introduce a profound constitutional crisis.

At the core of this crisis lies a fundamental tension between the operational logic of data-driven algorithmic systems and the normative premises of European constitutionalism. European constitutional law is founded upon the primary inviolability of human dignity, personal self-determination, procedural transparency, and the rule of law. Algorithmic systems, conversely, rely on statistical probabilities, aggregate data modeling, and deep learning architectures that are inherently opaque, dynamic, and probabilistic. When human individuals are reduced to data points and processed through opaque statistical constructs, their legal status transforms from autonomous moral subjects into objects of technological calculation.

This structural transformation directly challenges the doctrine of informational self-determination (*informationelle Selbstbestimmung*), established by the German Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) in its landmark 1983 Census Judgment (*Volkszählungsurteil*). The Court declared that a socio-legal order in which citizens cannot know who knows

what about them, when, and on what occasion, is incompatible with a democratic order grounded in personal self-determination and human dignity. In the digital age, where pervasive data collection occurs continuously across cloud infrastructure and personal devices, maintaining this constitutional guarantee requires a radical re-evaluation of current legal mechanisms.

1.2 Problem Statement and Research Objectives

Despite the enactment of comprehensive legislative frameworks—most notably the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)—the legal protection of fundamental rights against algorithmic overreach remains fragmented and structurally vulnerable. Statutory definitions framed around classical data processing modalities struggle to address the complex reality of generative models, autonomous agents, and cross-border profiling networks.

The primary legal problem investigated in this study is whether the normative protections enshrined within European data protection and constitutional law are structurally equipped to protect human dignity, privacy, and procedural fairness against algorithmic governance. To address this overarching inquiry, this paper establishes three primary objectives. First, it analyzes the normative foundations of human dignity and privacy under Article 1 and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights alongside national constitutional traditions, specifically the German Grundgesetz. Second, it evaluates the statutory efficacy and judicial interpretation of Article 22 of the GDPR regarding automated individual decision-making and profiling. Third, it formulates a refined legal model for algorithmic accountability capable of preserving individual agency within automated digital ecosystems.

2. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Research Methodology

This study adopts a doctrinal, constitutional, and normative legal research methodology, supported by comparative European jurisprudence. The primary analysis examines EU primary law, including the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This is integrated with an analysis of secondary legislation, centered on Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the European Artificial Intelligence Act).

The legal analysis examines decisions from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and key national constitutional courts, primarily the German Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*). To evaluate statutory interpretation, this research applies standard canons of legal construction: grammatical, teleological, systematic, and historical analysis. The doctrinal evaluation is combined with a normative assessment of structural legal gaps created by emergent machine learning paradigms.

2.2 Theoretical Framework: Human Dignity and Informational Autonomy

The theoretical structure of this study rests upon two primary pillars: Kantian Deontology as incorporated into modern constitutional law, and the Theory of Contextual Integrity formulated by Helen Nissenbaum.

The constitutional doctrine of human dignity (*Menschenwürde*), enshrined in Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law and Article 1 of the EU Charter, is interpreted through the lens of Kant's Categorical Imperative. This foundational concept asserts that human beings must always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to an end. In legal jurisprudence, this is operationalized through Günter Dürig's Object Formula (*Objektformel*). Under the Object Formula, human dignity is violated whenever an individual is subjected to treatment that reduces them to a mere object, an interchangeable unit, or a numerical calculation of state or private action. Automated decision-making platforms that evaluate, classify, and sanction individuals strictly on the basis of statistical profiling risk violating this principle by bypassing individual agency, subjective context, and personal responsibility.

Complementing this constitutional principle, the Theory of Contextual Integrity posits that privacy is not merely a right to secrecy or a control mechanism over information, but a guarantee that information flows strictly conform to context-specific legal and social norms. Algorithmic governance frequently violates contextual integrity by harvesting personal data from diverse operational domains, aggregating it into unified profiles, and applying it to contexts entirely disconnected from the original point of data generation.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

3.1 Article 1 and Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European constitutional order establishes a dual mechanism for fundamental rights protection in the digital domain. Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes human dignity as an absolute fundamental value that forms the primary basis of all subsequent fundamental rights. Article 8 of the Charter introduces a specific, autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data, distinct from Article 7's right to respect for private and family life.

The autonomy of Article 8 represents a major evolution in European fundamental rights doctrine. Unlike traditional negative freedoms that protect individuals against state intrusion, Article 8 creates a positive obligation on public institutions to establish comprehensive legal and procedural frameworks ensuring that personal data is processed fairly, for specified purposes, on the basis of consent or another legitimate basis laid down by law, and subject to oversight by independent authorities.

The interplay between Article 1 (Human Dignity) and Article 8 (Data Protection) produces a constitutional guarantee: data processing operations cannot be treated as routine commercial transactions or administrative matters if they threaten the essential moral agency and legal personality of the individual. When automated systems make binding legal determinations regarding access to social benefits, criminal justice evaluation, or employment opportunities without genuine human review, they breach this constitutional boundary.

3.2 The Jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court

The German Federal Constitutional Court has provided essential jurisprudence regarding digital fundamental rights. Through a series of decisions, the Court expanded the general right of personality (*Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht*) derived from Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law.

In the historic 1983 Census Judgment, the Court established the fundamental right to informational self-determination. The Court held that under modern conditions of data processing, an individual's freedom to act and participate in public life is severely undermined if they cannot control the dissemination and processing of their personal information. The psychological burden of potential surveillance creates a chilling effect (*Abschreckungseffekt*) that stifles democratic participation and personal development.

In its 2008 Information Technology Judgment (*IT-Grundrecht*), the Court extended this doctrine by constructing a new fundamental right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information-technical systems. Recognizing that personal computers and mobile devices contain intimate profiles of an individual's identity, thoughts, and lifestyle, the Court established a high constitutional threshold for state access to personal computing devices.

More recently, in its 2023 Automated Data Analysis Judgment regarding police software practices, the Court struck down statutory provisions permitting automated cross-referencing and analytical processing of stored operational data. The Court ruled that complex automated data analysis generates a deep intrusion into fundamental rights, requiring specific, clear statutory grounds tied to imminent public threats. The jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court demonstrates that algorithmic processing must be subject to strict constitutional controls tailored to the depth, scale, and potential harm of the automated intervention.

4. STATUTORY EVALUATION OF ARTICLE 22 GDPR: LIMITS AND AMBIGUITIES

4.1 Statutory Structure and the Prohibition Paradigm

Within secondary EU law, Article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation serves as the primary legislative safeguard against automated decision-making. Paragraph 1 states that the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.

A critical debate in data protection doctrine concerns the legal nature of Article 22(1). One school of thought argued that Article 22(1) merely establishes an individual right that must be explicitly invoked by the data subject through an objection. The dominant

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